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For most militaries today the primary task is 
the handling of international crises, ranging 
from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, 
peace enforcing and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. It will be obvious that these new operations 
require a great deal of self-control on the side of 
military personnel, who have to do their work 
in circumstances that are in general stressful, 
and sometimes frustrating. Incidents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, such as the killing of 39 civilians 
by Australian special forces in Afghanistan be-
tween 2005 and 2016, underline the importance 
of finding ways to prevent military personnel 
crossing the line between legitimate force and 
unlawful violence.1
To that end, militaries traditionally relied on 
rules and codes of conduct. Rules make clear to 
military personnel which actions are off-limits, 
and rule-based ethics point to the importance 
of having universal, categorically binding mor-
al norms. Such a confidence in the beneficial 
effects of rules and codes has its drawbacks, 
though. According to some the impact of codes 
of conduct is fairly limited to begin with,2 while 
others point out that rule-based approaches are 
rigid, and largely ineffective when there are no 
witnesses around. Rules can even impede the 
ability to see the moral aspect of what one is do-
ing, while that ability is evidently an important 
prerequisite for morally sound decision mak-
ing. Although rules ideally codify what is just, in 
concrete cases what the rules stipulate can be 
manifestly unjust. Following the rules without 
too much thinking could in some instances thus 
lead to “crimes of obedience.”3 Rules, in sum, 
lack flexibility, even when that flexibility is ob-
viously needed, and soldiers should therefore 
have some autonomy in their decision making.4 
To use this autonomy in an ethical way, sol-
diers need a good disposition, and it is for that 
reason that many militaries see a virtue-based 
approach to military ethics and military ethics 
education as a necessary counterpart to rules 
imposed from above. Virtue ethics is in keeping 
with the tendency of many militaries to move 
away in their ethics education from a functional 
approach towards an aspirational approach that 
aims at making soldiers better persons, mainly 





How can military personnel be prevented from using force 
 unlawfully? A critical examination of typical methods and the 
 suitability of virtue ethics for this task starts with the 
inadequacies of a purely rules-based approach, and the fact that 
many armed forces increasingly rely on character development 
training. The three investigated complexes also raise further 
questions which require serious consideration – such as about the 
general teachability of virtues. 
First, the changing roles and responsibilities of modern armed 
forces are used to refute the notion that timeless, “classic” military 
virtues exist, for example physical courage. With regard to today’s 
missions, virtues of restraint seem more necessary. Reflecting on 
the four interrelated and less military-specific cardinal virtues of 
courage, wisdom, temperance and justice could bring the military 
and civil society closer together. At the same time, this would be a 
logical step towards promoting personality development.
Respect is one example of such a “contemporary” inclusive 
virtue that some armed forces have adopted into their canon of 
values. Apparently, however, it often refers only to members 
of one’s own organization. And it is no less inappropriate 
to use it to justify moral relativism or excuse immoral practices, 
such as the widespread sexual abuse of Afghan boys by men in 
positions of power (“boy play”). 
Finally, the essay asks about the general suitability of a virtue- based 
approach in ethical education, since social  psychological research 
has shown that situational factors strongly influence behavior. The 
research findings do not render such an approach worthless, 
but they should be integrated into military personality training.
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to form morally good soldiers (although they still 
could be effective ones …). Such an aspirational 
approach sits rather well with the way most mil-
itaries see themselves: as being in the business 
of character-building. It is therefore a pity that 
many militaries seem to have adopted this as-
pirational virtue ethics approach in too carefree 
a manner. 
There are, in fact, quite a few unanswered 
questions regarding the suitability of virtue eth-
ics for the military, and this paper aims to ad-
dress three of the more pressing ones. The most 
important question, first of all, is of course which 
virtues we need. Are new virtues emerging be-
cause of changes in military tasks? Have some 
virtues gained significance? Have others lost 
their importance? Next, this paper addresses a 
virtue that has a modern ring to it but that we 
perhaps do not need, or at least not in all of its 
forms. Finally, the last section before the conclu-
sion deals with the sobering question whether 
virtues matter at all.
Which virtues do we need?
Which virtues military personnel need today de-
pends at least partly on whether what makes up 
a military virtue is place and time dependent. At 
first sight a convincing argument can be made 
that this is not the case. Some military virtues 
are valued in all eras and cultures, for instance 
because they perform an important function in 
or for the military.5 The archetypal military virtue 
of physical courage seems a textbook example. 
But a closer look shows that the type of courage 
that militaries need tends to change over time. 
Aristotle’s famous definition of courage as the 
mean between rashness and cowardice,6 for in-
stance, fitted the hoplite warfare of his day very 
well, as both an excess or a deficiency of bravery 
would destroy the organized whole the phalanx 
was. At present we see how the rise of a number 
of new technologies makes this type of physical 
courage outmoded for at least some parts of the 
military: cyber soldiers and UAV operators, for in-
stance, do not seem to need this type of courage 
at all. They probably do need moral courage, a 
subspecies of courage that asks us to stick to our 
principles even if others disagree.7 Regarding 
other central military virtues regularly appearing 
on lists of military virtues, such as loyalty, disci-
pline or obedience, it is at the minimum less ev-
ident what positive role they could have for, for 
instance, cyber operations or operating armed 
drones.8 More worrisome: most military virtues 
mainly pay attention to the interests and aims 
of the organization and colleagues. They are 
more functional than aspirational, which means 
among other things that they do contribute to 
the objectives of the military, but that there is 
little in them that limits the behavior of soldiers 
towards civilians. Assuming that the traditional 
martial virtues such as physical courage are of 
diminished use in today’s conflicts, we need to 
look for virtues that are better suited for today.
In light of the changed tasks of the military, 
the virtues needed at present are most like-
ly more about exercising restraint than about 
demonstrating physical courage, loyalty, and 
discipline. Such virtues of restraint will be less 
military-specific, and could therefore bring the 
military into closer alignment with general soci-
ety (and perhaps also with the principles of oth-
er professions that in general give central place 
to the interests of outsiders to the organization). 
Opting for virtues that are closer to “common 
morality” would fit the aspirational approach 
that militaries are moving towards better – we 
already noted that there is a tendency in many 
Western militaries toward a less functional ap-
proach. Now, it is fairly evident that there are 
important differences between mainly function-
al role morality and more aspirational common 
morality: lawyers, policemen and doctors all 
have obligations and rights other people do not 
have, and for good reasons.9 Although for mili-
tary personnel role morality clearly differs from 
ordinary morality too, as they are members of a 
profession that can legitimately use force, one 
could convincingly argue that militaries need a 
more outward-looking set of virtues for today’s 
In light of the changed tasks of 
the  military, the virtues needed at present 
are most likely more about exercising 
restraint than about demonstrating 
 physical courage, loyalty, and discipline
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missions that more often than not require re-
straint on the side of their personnel.10 If true, 
that still does not mean we have to design a new 
set of virtues from scratch. A likely source to turn 
to first when looking for such aspirational, com-
prehensive virtues are the “general” and time 
proven cardinal virtues that can be found in the 
work of authors such as Plato and Cicero.
As it stands, of the four cardinal virtues, only 
courage has made it to the traditional lists of mil-
itary virtues. The equally cardinal virtues of wis-
dom, temperance and justice, today probably 
at least as needed as courage is, are absent on 
most lists of military virtues (although they do 
appear in a recent volume on military virtues11). 
That is a loss, seeing that wisdom, justice and 
temperance are a lot more wide-ranging than 
the traditional military virtues are. What is more, 
they are typical virtues of restraint. Choosing 
these cardinal virtues would also do justice to 
the idea that all the virtues form a unified whole, 
and that therefore you cannot have one virtue 
without possessing the others, too. Wisdom un-
informed by justice may come close to cunning, 
for instance. Likewise, courage is of little use 
without practical wisdom to guide it, while that 
same courage is a not a virtue if it does not serve 
a just goal. And, somewhat similarly, if one lacks 
the courage to defend what is just, being just is 
not of much value to begin with. Such intercon-
nections are absent in the rather random collec-
tions of virtues that militaries nowadays live by. 
A virtue less needed?
Despite their ancient roots, opting for the cardi-
nal virtues would give the military a set of virtues 
that is more modern and comprehensive. Inter-
estingly, however, there is already one seeming-
ly outward-looking virtue that many militaries 
include on their value lists, and that is respect. 
Listing respect as a virtue is however not the 
concession to the current tasks of the military 
it might seem: a closer look reveals that respect 
in the military is often tacitly limited to respect 
toward colleagues.12 So although “respect” cer-
tainly sounds inclusive, at present the way some 
militaries interpret it bars it from being that. 
Such interpretations fail to take into account 
that military personnel will often be doing their 
job amidst the local population. Why exactly 
militaries are disinclined to include outsiders 
remains a puzzle, given that respect for outsid-
ers does not diminish the amount of respect left 
to show colleagues. A more all-encompassing 
interpretation of this virtue would seem a wel-
come step ahead. 
But respect as an inclusive virtue has a flip-
side: there are occasions in which a broad inter-
pretation of respect can in fact be too much of 
a good thing. When deployed, Western military 
personnel regularly encounter local practices 
that clash with their Western values, and some-
times pre-deployment training underlines the 
importance of respect for such local customs.13 
This is partly for good reasons: military person-
nel sent abroad need to have sufficient knowl-
edge of local sensitivities. Yet emphasizing the 
need to respect other people’s customs can 
provide Western soldiers with a ground for not 
intervening in cases of corruption or the cruel 
treatment of women and children. In Afghani-
stan, Western military personnel regularly wit-
nessed the practice of “boy play,” a euphemism 
for men in positions of power “owning” boys 
who serve tea, dance – and suffer sexual abuse. 
A soldier deployed to Afghanistan relates how 
the subject wasn’t discussed at all during mis-
sion-specific training, but that they “did learn 
that we must respect local culture.”14 Soldiers on 
a mission sometimes end up believing that “the 
situation is culturally determined and therefore 
unchangeable,” when it is in fact not.15 The grad-
ual eroding of moral standards plays a role too: 
referring to the practice of boy play, a member of 
the Dutch military explained that “[t]he peculiar 
thing is that it becomes more and more ‘normal’ 
(...) After six months, you start to adjust and start 
to assimilate local customs and we practically 
never talked about it, you get used to it.”16 
In reality, our idea that the sexual abuse of 
boys is part of Afghan culture is mistaken; like 
everyone else, most Afghans think the practice 
immoral, and the sexual molesting of boys is 
not defensible within the value framework of Af-
ghan society. Ironically, the Taliban suppressed 
the practice of boy play during their years in 
power fairly successfully; it resurfaced after their 
rule ended. Afghan law, by the way, still forbids 
it. But even if most or all Afghans thought that 
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child molesting was right, would that really im-
ply that we should respect their position? Clearly 
not, because child molesting is a clear violation 
of important external standards; condoning 
every practice that meets internal standards 
would overlook that we are also member of a 
more cosmopolitan moral community. That the 
majority in certain societies approves of certain 
practices does not make these practices right. 
A seemingly inclusive virtue like respect does 
more harm than good if it provides soldiers with 
a ground to look away. 
This looking away is sometimes defended 
with the argument that moral judgments are 
place and time dependent. This moral relativ-
ism consists of the empirical claim that there is 
widespread moral disagreement, and the meta-
ethical claim that the truth of moral judgments 
is “relative to the moral standard of some person 
or group of persons.”17 Some think that the em-
pirical claim demonstrates the metaethical one. 
But that empirical claim is most likely incorrect; 
the nearly universal taboo on killing and stealing 
testifies to that.18 That most Afghans do not ap-
prove of the practice of boy play also suggests 
that there is some basic morality that most peo-
ple agree on. Most of what looks like disagree-
ment about values is in fact disagreement about 
the norms that we derive from these values. Only 
the most radical forms of relativism do not see a 
role for at least some very basic rights to serve as 
a check on all too particularistic practices.19 Not 
speaking out against such practices also over-
looks that tolerance, like respect, is a matter of 
reciprocity: there is no obligation to “bear” the 
intolerant.20 
That leaves us with the question where a line 
should be drawn. According to Thomas Scan-
lon, a good test when thinking about right and 
wrong is “thinking about what could be justified 
to others on grounds that they, if appropriate-
ly motivated, could not reasonably reject.”21 
Clearly, the practice of boy play does not pass 
that test. It is therefore important that respect 
is balanced by other virtues that can function 
as correctives to too much relativism and the 
accompanying tendency to put aside one’s own 
values. The already mentioned cardinal virtues 
such as justice and wisdom, but certainly also 
(moral) courage, can perform that role. Such 
virtues can provide guidance to military per-
sonnel in morally ambiguous situations, where 
providing general rules and guidelines for such 
complex situations will not work.
But do virtues make  
a difference?
In the sections above the focus was on vir-
tue-based approaches to military ethics as 
this is the approach that most militaries have 
embraced – partly because of shortcomings 
of more rule-based approaches. But a vir-
tue-based approach has its own drawbacks, the 
main one being that it assumes a direct relation 
between character and conduct. An assumption 
that might very well be wrong: over the last few 
decades a host of empirical research has shown 
that situations determine conduct to a far great-
er extent than character does. We tend to make 
a fundamental attribution error, meaning that 
we underrate the influence of situational factors 
and, as a consequence, over-attribute behavior 
to personality and character. This is at heart the 
old intuition that knowing what is good and 
doing good are not the same thing.22 Especial-
ly Milgram’s famous studies on obedience and 
Zimbardo’s equally well-known Stanford Prison 
Experiment have popularized the idea that situ-
ations can make us harm innocent others. 
Ethicists take these insights about how situ-
ations determine conduct more and more into 
account, fearing that virtue ethics suffers from a 
mistaken focus on the individual. The idea that 
it is unvirtuous individuals that commit atroc-
ities could well be false, seeing that the situa-
tional forces soldiers experience in combat are 
so much stronger than the situational factors 
that already caused so many research sub-
jects of Milgram and Zimbardo to transgress 
the most basic norms.23 Sleep deprivation, de-
We tend to make a fundamental attri-
bution error, meaning that we under rate 
the influence of situational  factors and, 
as a consequence, over-attribute  behavior 
to personality and character
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humanization, stress, (racial) ideology, strong 
loyalty to colleagues and the organization and 
negative peer pressure can make unethical be-
havior just about inevitable.24 
Modern social psychology research challeng-
es both virtue ethics and, as a consequence, 
also any military ethics education that builds 
on this school of thought. If this so-called situa-
tionism is true, militaries are duty-bound to in-
crease awareness of the factors that determine 
the conduct of military personnel, and make 
efforts to improve the ethical climate of the 
organization. The truth of the claim would also 
imply that the current emphasis on character 
formation and instilling virtues is by and large 
ineffective. Some, however, have drawn atten-
tion to the fact that the gist of the argument 
rests on an incomplete, or even biased, un-
derstanding of some famous studies in social 
psychology.25 We only read, for instance, about 
the participants in the experiments of Milgram 
and Zimbardo that succumbed to situational 
pressures, not about the many who resisted.26 
Moreover, virtue ethics assumes that we can 
acquire virtues if we work hard enough; it does 
not at all assume that we are born virtuous. 
The aim of military training is to teach relevant 
virtues, and situations might hence have less 
influence on well-trained soldiers than on the 
average participant (often a student) in a social 
psychology experiment. 
The unspectacular conclusion that our char-
acter and the situation both have an impact on 
our conduct leaves some ground for optimism 
concerning the role of character formation. 
Nonetheless, a military ethics education that 
does not pay sufficient attention to the short-
comings of a character-based approach would 
be too theoretical. Military ethics education 
should not only aim at building character, but 
also at giving insight in the factors that make 
unethical conduct more likely to take place. 
The social psychologist’s advice to avoid mor-
ally challenging situations is clearly not of 
much use in a military context, but with a better 
understanding of the influence situational fac-
tors have, a lot more can be done to make the 
erosion of moral standards less likely to occur.
Discussion
Today’s soldiers do need virtues, but not nec-
essarily of the “duty, honor, country” kind. The 
virtues we teach military personnel are to fit 
their tasks, and if the virtues militaries tradition-
ally promote are of less use in today’s conflicts, 
formulating a new list of virtues would be an 
obvious way ahead. Above, a few suggestions 
have been made regarding virtues needed and 
less needed, and whether virtues make much of 
a difference to begin with. However, these ques-
tions – which virtues, and do they matter? – are 
just a few of the questions surrounding a virtue 
ethics approach to military ethics education. 
To highlight a few of the others: virtue ethics is 
based on the idea that virtues can be educated, 
but is this true? And if it is, how should this be 
done? If virtues are acquired through training 
and practice, how do we teach virtues in a class-
room? And at what age? – if one’s personality is 
formed before adulthood, this presents a chal-
lenge for militaries that want to mold characters. 
A more fundamental question is whether 
virtue ethics actually forms a better basis for 
military ethics education then deontology and 
consequentialism. Virtue ethics is about the 
flourishing of the possessor of virtues, and that 
makes virtue ethics somewhat self-regarding 
compared to, say, the utilitarian credo of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number, or 
the deontological golden rule that you should 
do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you. For instance: most deontologists think tor-
ture should always be forbidden, regardless of 
what is at stake, while a utilitarian could point 
out that the harm torture causes outweighs the 
benefits (that other utilitarians might argue the 
opposite probably explains the bad reputation 
that utilitarianism has in military ethics). A vir-
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tue ethicist, though, would highlight that the 
most important matter is to be the kind of per-
son who would never use torture. Torture, from 
a virtue ethics perspective, “does not tend to 
produce in its practitioners the virtues of cour-
age, justice, temperance, and practical wisdom 
but rather (...) their opposites.”27 But would a 
potential victim of torture care about the char-
acter of the torturer? To complicate matters a 
bit further: militaries promote virtues for exter-
nal goals like mission success or stimulating the 
ethical use of force, as we have noted above, 
and that makes it doubtful whether it is really 
virtue ethics that is practiced here. Encourag-
ing certain virtues because of their good effects 
amounts to what is sometimes described as 
character utilitarianism.28 That is not necessarily 
a bad thing, but it does testify to a rather func-
tional approach towards ethics. Military ethics 
educators should have the courage to seriously 
grapple with such questions and complications 
instead of leaving them largely unaddressed.
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